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Abstract 
Using data from a stated preferences experiment in the Netherlands, we find that replacing 
full-time pension schemes with schemes that offer gradual retirement opportunities induce 
workers to retire one year later on average. Total life-time labour supply, however, decreases 
with 3.4 months because the positive effect of delayed retirement on labour supply is 
cancelled out by the reduction in working hours before full retirement. The impact of gradual 
retirement schemes is, however, heterogeneous across groups of workers. Workers with non-
routine job tasks retire at a later age when they can gradually retire. Financial incentives, 
either in terms of changing pension income or the price of leisure, also affect the expected 
retirement age, but the impact of these financial incentives does not differ with the possibility 
of gradual retirement. Finally, we find that gradual retirement is not a preferred option among 
workers as the large majority still prefers full retirement. This especially holds for workers 
with a lower wage and those with higher life expectancy. 
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Introduction 
As a result of population ageing and declining fertility, many industrialized countries with 
‘pay-as-you-go’ pension systems face a steady decrease in the ratio of contributing workers 
to inactive retirees who draw from these schemes. These unfunded systems will become 
financially unsustainable unless labour supply of older workers or productivity increases fast 
enough to compensate for the negative demographics. Most industrialized countries have 
therefore already started to implement major pension reforms aimed at increasing the labour 
supply of older workers. These reforms include, among others, decreases in the generosity of 
pension benefits and increases in the eligibility age for early and statutory retirement (Gruber 
and Wise 1998; Duval 2005; Mastrobuoni 2009; Kangas et al. 2010; Börsch-Supan 2012; 
Staubli and Zweimüller 2013). In addition, in several countries gradual retirement schemes 
have been introduced, whereby workers do not end their career abruptly but rather in a 
stepwise fashion (Reday-Mulvey 2000; Warren 2015). This could enable workers to extend 
their working life with a lower workload.
2
   
Existing literature stresses that the introduction of gradual retirement schemes can 
have major benefits both at the micro and the macro level (Kantarci and Van Soest 2008). At 
the micro level, gradual-retirement schemes can improve life time utility as they introduce the 
possibility to avoid a pension shock following an abrupt transition from full-time work to 
full-time retirement, and extend the choice set of older workers (Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 
                                                          
2 In the past two decades, gradual retirement schemes were first adopted in combination with early retirement 
programs and were only later introduced as an alternative instrument to reduce complete early withdrawal from 
the labor market. Sweden was one of the first countries to adapt a gradual scheme in 1976. In Denmark, a 
reform in 1987 aimed to promote gradual retirement by replacing the system of full early retirement with a part-
time work regime. In Finland, a partial retirement scheme was introduced for wage earners aged 60 or older in 
the late 1980s, which was extended in the 1990s to workers aged 56 or older and was further stimulated by 
additional incentives (e.g., tax breaks for firms). Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands now 
also offer the option to enter gradual or partial retirement before or after the standard retirement age. Also 
outside Europe gradual retirement schemes have been introduced. For example, the Australian government 
stimulated gradual retirement transitions by introducing “transition to retirement” pensions in 2005, which allow 
older workers to reduce their working hours and access part of their superannuation savings in the form of a 
pension to supplement their labour income (Warren 2015).  
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1996; Reday-Mulvey 2000). Gradual retirement may reduce the burden of work, and thereby 
reduce work-related stress and increase employee morale, enabling workers to keep working 
beyond an age at which they would otherwise have fully retired (Kantarci and Van Soest 
2008). Finally, at the macro level, it is claimed that gradual retirement schemes may increase 
the retirement age by facilitating work after the effective retirement age and therefore restrain 
early withdrawal from the labour market provided the introduction of these schemes is 
accompanied by a pension scheme with the right financial incentives. This would enhance the 
financial sustainability of current pension schemes. Gradual retirement may, however, also 
lead to a reduction in total labour supply when workers engage in early part-time retirement, 
while they otherwise would have chosen to continue to work on a full-time basis. The total 
effect on labour supply therefore depends on which of these two effects is the largest, making 
the net effect of gradual retirement schemes on total labour supply ambiguous. This raises the 
question to what extent the introduction of gradual retirement opportunities actually 
stimulates workers to continue working, and to what extent it can be expected to increase 
total labour supply. The next question is whether the effects differ with the financial 
incentives provided by the pension system to postpone retirement. 
This paper uses a stated preference approach to study the impact of a gradual 
retirement scheme on the expected retirement age and total labour supply of Dutch public 
sector workers. We furthermore investigate whether the effects differ with the financial 
incentives provided by the pension system, and explore the heterogeneity in the impact of the 
introduction of gradual retirement opportunities on retirement preferences of workers with 
different personal and job characteristics. Our stated preference approach consists of six 
vignettes in which respondents get hypothetical (but realistic) retirement scenarios that either 
involve gradual or full retirement and vary in terms of financial incentives (either in terms of 
changing the price of leisure or in terms of changing pension income). Respondents are asked 
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to indicate at what age they would retire, and are subsequently asked to compare and rank the 
preferred choices they made when confronted with the different scenarios. The main reason 
why we use a stated rather than revealed preferences approach is that we want to estimate 
preferences for pension plans which do not yet exist or to which many workers so far do not 
have access.
3
 Moreover, the vignette design ensures that the choice alternatives are known to 
the researcher, and that the variation in choices is sufficiently large and by construction 
exogenous to preferences.
4
 Because of this exogenous variation, the estimated effects are 
likely to be causal.  
We find that the replacement of full-time retirement schemes with a gradual 
retirement scheme stimulates workers to retire, on average, one year later. Nevertheless, total 
labour supply significantly decreases by 3.4 months when workers have the gradual 
retirement option, as the positive effect of delayed retirement on labour supply is cancelled 
out by the reduction of working hours preceding full retirement. The impact of the 
introduction of gradual retirement schemes is, however, heterogeneous across groups of 
workers. In particular, workers with non-routine job tasks are inclined to retire later (and 
increase their overall labour supply) when they have the possibility to gradually retire. We 
furthermore show that the positive impact of financial incentives to postpone retirement on 
workers’ retirement expectations does not differ between gradual and full retirement options. 
Finally, our ranking analysis of workers’ preference for the different scenarios shows that 
                                                          
3 Most previous studies focused on actual retirement decisions and suggested that the introduction of gradual 
retirement schemes could indeed lead to a postponement of retirement, although the effects on total labour 
supply are small or non-existent (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier 2004; Gielen 2009; Machado and Portela 2012). 
However, since these studies focus on actual retirement decisions they do not identify all retirement options 
which were available to older workers, because the options that are not chosen cannot be observed, or because it 
is not even clear which options workers would have chosen when they would have had the opportunity to 
choose (Kantarci and Van Soest 2008 2013). The latter is particularly relevant for studies on the impact of 
gradual retirement plans, since it is often unclear whether employers offer such a plan, and, if they do, which 
trajectory of earnings and pension incomes a plan offers. This especially holds because gradual retirement 
arrangements are often based on informal agreements negotiated between an employee and his/her employer 
(Hutchens 2010). Our stated preferences approach circumvents this type of problem.  
4 This method is extensively used in marketing research (see, for example, Louviere et al. 2002) and is gaining 
quickly ground in economics (see, for example, Barsky et al. 1997, Revelt and Train 1998; and, specifically for 
labour supply, Kimball and Shapiro 2010; Van Soest and Vonkova 2014).  
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gradual retirement is not a preferred option among workers as the large majority still prefers 
full retirement. In particular, workers with a lower wage and a higher life expectancy rank the 
gradual retirement scenario lower. Our results therefore suggest that the introduction of 
gradual retirement opportunities in the Netherlands would not contribute to a further increase 
in labour supply.  
We contribute to the existing literature on gradual retirement and labour supply of 
older workers in three important ways. Firstly, this paper is the first to study the causal link 
between the introduction of gradual retirement opportunities on total labour supply. Only a 
few studies have investigated the relationship between flexible work hours and older 
workers’ total labour supply providing mixed evidence. While Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2004) found that the abolishment of minimum hours constraints would result in a small net 
increase in full-time equivalent employment, Gielen (2009) and Machado and Portela (2012) 
found explorative suggestive evidence that total labour supply of older workers may even 
decrease when flexibility in work hours would increase. Secondly, this paper builds on two 
related studies of Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and Van Soest (2013). These studies 
used stated preferences experiments that show that many workers could be convinced to work 
part-time if they are given fair financial compensation, but also that many workers are more 
likely to choose full-time retirement over partial retirement.
5
 Our study differs from these 
studies because we not only study the impact of gradual retirement on retirement 
expectations, but also its net impact on total labour supply. Moreover, a great advantage of 
our study is that the base scheme in our stated preference experiment is similar to the actual 
pension scheme of public sector workers in the Netherlands allowing for more realistic 
estimates of the effects of gradual retirement opportunities on the labour supply of older 
                                                          
5
 Stated preference experiments have also been used in retirement studies which did not focus on gradual 
retirement (e.g., Van Soest and Vonkova 2014). 
5 
 
workers.
6
 Thirdly, we go beyond previous studies by showing that the introduction of gradual 
retirement schemes has heterogeneous effects on the retirement age and labour supply of 
different groups of workers, depending on their personal and job characteristics. 
 
Data and experimental design 
Data collection 
For this study, the public sector’s pension fund provided us with 13,151 randomly selected 
email addresses of Dutch public sector employees born between 1946 and 1975. In the first 
week of April 2015, we sent an e-mail to these employees containing the link to a web-based 
survey (the ROA Public Sector Survey 2015), in which detailed questions were asked on 
individual and job characteristics, the existence of alternative sources of income after 
retirement, and partner characteristics. Moreover, it included the stated preferences 
experiment we use to investigate workers’ retirement age and labour supply until retirement 
under full-time and gradual retirement schemes and different sets of financial incentives. In 
total, we have an estimation sample of 3,611 individuals who completed the survey.
7
 
 
Experimental design 
The stated preference experiment makes use of vignettes in which individuals were 
confronted with various hypothetical pension schemes. The stated preference experiment is 
introduced by a short introductory text explaining the topic, after which employees were 
assigned to six vignettes presenting pension scheme scenarios (involving either gradual or 
full retirement), including different financial incentives and containing a set of retirement 
                                                          
6
 Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and Van Soest (2013) used highly stylized regimes that are not related to 
actual pension schemes in the Netherlands and did not allow for different durations of gradual retirement in their 
scenarios.  
7
 A further 1,643 individuals were already retired and answered a shortened version of the questionnaire that did 
not contain the stated preferences experiment. We also excluded 1,867 individuals who were 63 or older as it is 
quite likely that they have already chosen their preferred retirement path.  
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ages and related replacement rates (in percentage of their current net income). For each 
scenario, respondents were asked which retirement age and associated replacement rate they 
prefer, making it possible to quantify how changes in financial incentives affect the gradual 
and full-time retirement age. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the introductory text and two 
examples of the vignettes.  
We designed in total ten different pension schemes scenarios with different retirement 
ages and replacement rate combinations. Each respondent had to respond to two baseline 
scenarios: one that allows workers to retire only full-time, and another one that allows 
workers to retire gradually. The replacement rates in both baseline scenarios closely match 
those applied to an average public sector employee in the Netherlands at the time of the 
survey with actuarially fair accruals of 5%, and a 90% replacement rate upon retirement at 
the age of 68 for regular retirement, and at the age of 70 for gradual retirement.8,9 The other 
eight scenarios differ from one another in terms of the incentives for continued employment 
provided by the retirement scheme. We implement a price of leisure type of incentive 
(accruals of 7.5 or 10% for an additional year of employment), and a pension income type of 
incentive (decreasing pension income at all ages with 5 or 10%). Four of these pension 
scheme scenarios allow workers to choose their preferred age of full-time retirement, while 
                                                          
8 The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first consists of a flat-rate public scheme (AOW) to 
which all residents are entitled, regardless of whether they are employee, self-employed or never participated in 
the labor market. The AOW provides Dutch residents with a pension benefit that guarantees 70% of the net 
minimum wage for a single household and 50% for each partner in a couple (either married or officially living 
together). For decades, the eligibility age for the AOW was 65. Due to a recent reform, however, the eligibility 
age for the large majority of the employees in our dataset will be 67. It is, however, very likely that this age will 
increase in the near future as the eligibility age for the AOW is now linked to the life expectancy in the 
Netherlands. A small but increasing percentage of Dutch employees currently remains at work after the 
eligibility for the state pension, on a temporary as well as a part-time basis. The second pillar consists of 
supplementary earnings-related pensions. This is a defined-benefit type of pension for employees organized at 
the sector or firm level. This pension can also be used to retire early, before the eligibility age for the state 
pension. Although compensation for inflation is the default for supplementary earnings-related pensions, it has 
not been given in the last few years, due to the rising ratio between liabilities and assets of almost all pension 
funds. The third pillar includes all voluntarily built-up savings that are in addition to the first two pillars. Due to 
the well-established first two pillars of the Dutch pension system, the third pillar is less developed in the 
Netherlands than in other countries.   
9
 For gradual retirement in our scenarios, each additional year of gradual retirement is counted as half a year in 
terms of accrual rates. 
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the other scenarios allow for gradual retirement with a number of years of part-time 
employment before full-time retirement. Apart from the baseline scenarios, each respondent 
was randomly given two regular and two gradual retirement scenarios.
10
 
Table 1 shows the ten pension scenarios with their combinations of retirement age and 
replacement rate. Scenario 1 is the full-time baseline scenario. It offers a replacement rate of 
90% of the net wage if the individual chooses to retire at the age of 68. For each additional 
year of work, the replacement rate increases by 5%-points. Scenarios 2 and 3 increase the 
price of leisure incentive. For each additional year of work, the replacement rate increases by 
7.5%-points and 10%-points for Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively. However, in these two 
scenarios the replacement rate remains at the level of 90% of the net wage if the individual 
chooses to retire at the age of 68. Scenarios 4 and 5 show the pension income incentive. 
While the two scenarios keep the increase in the replacement rate for each additional year of 
work at the level of 5%-points, they change the replacement rate at each year of retirement, 
regardless of the age of retirement. In Scenario 4 the replacement rate is 85% for retiring at 
68, while in Scenario 5 it is 80% for retiring at that age. 
Scenarios 6 to 10 introduce gradual retirement. In these scenarios, individuals work 
50% of their time and are retired for the other 50%.
11
 The net income received when 
gradually retired is the sum of the part-time wage and the part-time pension and equals the 
pension after full-time retirement. Scenario 6 is the gradual retirement baseline scenario. It 
offers a replacement rate of 90% of the net wage if the individual chooses to work part-time 
at the age of 66, and fully retires at the age of 70. For each additional full-time-equivalent 
year of work, the replacement rate increases by 5%-points.
12
 Scenarios 7 and 8 increase the 
price of leisure incentive. For each full-time-equivalent year of work, the replacement rate 
                                                          
10
  The order in which the scenarios were presented to the respondents has also been randomized. 
11
 This corresponds roughly with the average number of hours workers intend to retire part-time, as reported in 
the ROA Public Sector Survey 2014. 
12
 This means an increase in income of 2.5%-points for each additional year of gradual retirement. 
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increases by 7.5%-points and 10%-points in Scenarios 7 and 8, respectively.
13
 The 
replacement rate is 90% of the net wage if the individual chooses to work part-time at the age 
of 66, and fully retires at the age of 70. Scenarios 9 and 10 keep the increase in replacement 
rate for each additional year of full-time-equivalent work at the level of 5%-points, but 
decrease the replacement rate regardless the age of retirement. In Scenario 9 the replacement 
rate is 85% (80% in Scenario 10) when an individual gradually retires at the age of 66, and 
fully retires at age 70.  
Finally, after the stated preferences experiment, respondents were asked to rank their 
choices on (part-time or full-time) retirement ages and replacement rates in the various 
scenarios from the most preferred (coded 6) to the least preferred one (coded 1). 
  
Descriptive statistics 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows summary statistics of respondents’ main background 
characteristics. The table shows that the majority of the respondents in our analysis are male, 
highly educated employees with an average age of 56. The proportion of highly educated 
public sector workers in our sample is consistent with that in other datasets, such as the Dutch 
Labour Supply Panel.  To check the randomization of the scenarios in the stated preferences 
experiment, Table A2 in the Appendix reports the summary statistics for all 10 retirement 
scenarios. The table shows that there are no statistically significant differences in background 
characteristics across the different scenarios. 
  
                                                          
13
 This implies an increase in income of 3.75%-points and 5%-points, for each additional year of gradual 
retirement, respectively. 
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Empirical approach 
We estimate OLS models in which we regress the preferred age of retirement and the full-
time-equivalent age of retirement (measuring total labour supply at the end of a worker’s 
career) on the characteristics of the pension schemes in the stated preferences experiment.
14,15
  
Because part-time retirement in our scenarios involves that individuals work 50% of their 
time and for the other 50% are retired, the full-time equivalent age of retirement increases 
with only 6 months with every additional year that individuals retire part-time. In case of a 
full-time pension scheme, an increase in the chosen age of retirement equals the increase in 
the full-time-equivalent age of retirement.  
The main explanatory variable is the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
retirement scenario includes gradual retirement (Scenarios 6-9) and 0 otherwise. We 
furthermore include two variables that measure the price of leisure and pension income 
incentives. We measure the price of leisure incentive by a variable that takes the value 0 for 
Scenarios 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 (5% accruals), the value 1 for Scenarios 2 and 7 (7.5% 
accruals), and the value 2 for Scenarios 3 or 8 (10% accruals). Thus, a one point increase on 
this scale represents the effect of a 2.5 percentage point’s increase in the price of leisure. We 
measure the pension income incentive by a variable that takes the value 0 for Scenarios 1, 2, 
3,  6, 7, and 8 (90% replacement rate), the value 1 for Scenarios 4 and 9 (85% replacement 
rate), and the value 2 for Scenarios 5 and 10 (80% replacement rate). Therefore, a one point 
increase on this scale represents a 5%-points decrease in the pension income. Furthermore, 
we include dummy variables in our models that control for the randomisation order of the 
scenarios.  
                                                          
14
 The characteristics of the pension schemes include dummy variables indicating whether the scenario includes 
gradual retirement, which financial incentives are given by the pension system, and which randomisation order 
of the scenarios applied. 
15 Because each individual in the dataset reported a retirement age under six different retirement scenarios, we 
use a clustered sandwich estimator to allow for intragroup correlation on the individual level (Rogers 1993: 
Wooldridge 2002). 
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Gradual retirement, retirement age, and labour supply 
Main analysis 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of retirement choices across the different retirement 
scenarios. The figure clearly shows that gradual retirement scenarios shift the retirement age 
upwards. While the retirement age that is most often chosen in the full-time retirement 
scenarios ranges between ages 65 and 66, respondents most often choose the age of 67 for 
full retirement in gradual retirement scenarios. Ages 65 and 66 correspond to the past social 
norm in the Netherlands to retire at the old eligibility age of 65 for the statutory old age 
pension, while age 67 corresponds to the highest eligibility age as of 2021. The figure 
furthermore shows that the expected retirement age is responsive to financial incentives, and 
that at each level of financial incentives, the expected retirement age is slightly higher in 
gradual retirement scenarios than in full-time retirement scenarios. Most strikingly, the 
gradual retirement option in combination with strong financial incentives to postpone 
retirement induces about 17.5% of the workers in our sample to continue working until age 
70.   
Table 2 provides more evidence by summarising the average retirement age and the 
full-time-equivalent age of retirement under each retirement scenario. The table shows that 
under the full-time retirement scenarios, the average retirement age (and full-time-equivalent 
age of retirement) in the baseline scenario is 64.97 years. The average retirement age 
increases to 65.84 when the price of leisure incentive increases from 5%-points to 7.5%-
points (Scenario 2), and additionally slightly increases to 66.05 when the price of leisure 
incentive goes from 7.5%-points to 10%-points (Scenario 3). A 5%-points decrease in 
pension income (Scenario 4) increases the age of retirement to 65.40. A further decrease in 
pension income by 5%-points increases the average age of retirement to almost 66 years 
(Scenario 5). 
11 
 
The table further confirms that average expected retirement ages are higher under 
gradual retirement scenarios than under full-time retirement scenarios with the same price of 
leisure or pension income incentives. However, the results change considerably when we 
look at the average full-time-equivalent retirement age. In the baseline scenario for gradual 
retirement (Scenario 6), the average retirement age is 65.95 which is almost one year later 
than in the full-time baseline scenario (Scenario 1). The average full-time-equivalent 
retirement age is, however, only 64.77, which is less than the average full-time retirement age 
in baseline scenario 1. When the price of leisure incentive increases to 7.5% and 10% in the 
gradual retirement scenarios (Scenarios 7 and 8), respectively, the average retirement age 
increases to 66.65 and 67.18, while the average full-time-equivalent retirement age increases 
only to 65.36 and 65.79, respectively. This implies that the average full-time-equivalent 
retirement age in these two scenarios is lower than the average full-time-equivalent 
retirement age in the full time retirement scenarios 2 and 3. Similarly, decreasing the pension 
income to 85% and 80% in the gradual retirement scenarios 9 and 10 increases the average 
retirement age to 66.34 and 66.68, and increases the average full-time-equivalent retirement 
age to 65.10 and 65.59, respectively. The average full-time-equivalent age in these two 
scenarios is again lower than in the scenarios 4 and 5. The results presented in Table 2 
therefore suggest that, although gradual retirement increases the retirement age, its impact on 
workers’ labour supply is negative. Moreover, the table shows that financial incentives to 
postpone retirement, irrespective whether they generate price of leisure or income shocks, 
increase both the expected retirement age and labour supply.  
 Table 3 shows the OLS estimations of the effect of gradual retirement on the expected 
retirement age (Columns 1-3) and the full-time-equivalent retirement age (Columns 4-6). 
Columns 1 and 4 show raw estimates which include only a dummy variable indicating 
whether the scenarios include gradual retirement. Columns 2 and 5 control for financial 
12 
 
incentives (i.e., price of leisure and pension income), and Columns 3 and 6 include an 
interaction between gradual retirement and financial incentives to investigate the extent to 
which the impact of gradual retirement schemes differs with the financial incentives provided 
by the pension system to continue working. The table shows that in gradual retirement 
systems workers expect to retire about one year later than in full-time retirement systems. 
When we consider the full-time equivalent retirement age, however, workers retire on 
average 3.4 months earlier under gradual retirement schemes. The replacement of full-time 
retirement schemes with gradual retirement schemes will therefore have negative 
consequences on workers’ overall labour supply, as the positive effect of gradual retirement 
on labour supply, as consequence of the postponement of full-time retirement, is outweighed 
by the reduction in labour supply due to the drop in weekly working hours in the years before 
full-time retirement.  
Table 3 further shows that a 2.5%-points increase in accruals postpones the expected 
retirement age by about 7.2 months, and that a 5%-points decrease in pension income 
increases the retirement age with 5.6 months. More importantly, we find no significant 
interaction effect between the financial incentives and our gradual retirement indicator on the 
expected retirement age. We do find, however, a small statistically significant negative 
interaction effect on the full-time-equivalent age of retirement, suggesting that labour supply 
under gradual retirement scenarios is slightly less responsive to changes in financial 
incentives.  
Figures 2a and 2b show the marginal effects (relative to the full-time base Scenario 1) 
for the different retirement scenarios on the probability to retire late (at ages 67 or older), at 
ages 65 and 66, or early (at age 62-64). The marginal effects are calculated based on the 
coefficient estimates of the multinomial logit model presented in Table A4 in the Appendix, 
and allow us to check for nonlinearities in the impact of gradual retirement on retirement 
13 
 
expectations.
16
 The figures show results that are largely consistent with the OLS estimates in 
Table 3. Gradual retirement substantially reduces the likelihood that workers wish to retire 
early (17%-points less likely to retire than in the base scenario) or at ages 65 and 66 (7%-
points less likely to retire).
17
 The figures furthermore show that especially strong accrual rates 
in combination with gradual retirement stimulate workers more to retire late (at age 67 or 
later) compared to the base scenario. Recall, however, that both interaction effects between 
the financial incentives and our gradual retirement indicator on the average expected 
retirement age in Table 3 were not statistically significant.  
 
Ranking preferences for gradual and full-time retirement 
From a theoretical perspective, we would expect that gradual-retirement schemes can 
contribute to improve life time utility as they introduce the possibility to avoid a shock due to 
the abrupt transition from full-time work to full-time retirement. Gradual retirement may 
further reduce the burden of work, and thereby reduce work-related stress and increase 
employee morale until full retirement (Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996; Reday-Mulvey 
2000).  
To measure respondents’ preferences for gradual retirement, we asked respondents to 
rank the choices they made in each of the six vignette scenarios. The respondents could rank 
their choices from most preferred (coded 6) to least preferred (coded 1). Column 1 of Table 4 
shows the average ranking of each retirement scenario. The table shows that the baseline full-
time retirement scenario, which also includes the most generous financial incentives, is the 
most preferred one (rank is 5.13), while the baseline gradual retirement scenario is less often 
preferred (rank is 4.39). When we compare the ranking of the other scenarios, it becomes 
clear that none of the gradual retirement scenarios is on average preferred to the full-time 
                                                          
16
 See also Van Soest et al. (2007) and Kantarci and Van Soest (2013).  
17
 This result is robust to different definitions of early and late retirement. 
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scenarios with equivalent financial incentives. Column 2 of Table 4 further shows that 57% 
of all workers chose the baseline full-time retirement scenario as their most preferred 
scenario, while only 26% chose the baseline gradual retirement scenario as their most 
preferred scenario. 
  Table 5 reports OLS-estimates on how the various attributes of the retirement 
scenarios relate to the rank of the scenarios.
18
 The table confirms that workers still prefer full-
time retirement. Scenarios with higher prices for leisure or stronger pension income 
incentives to postpone retirement are, as could be expected, ranked lower. The analysis 
including the interactions between gradual retirement and the two financial incentives finally 
shows that workers especially have distaste for the scenario including a combination of 
gradual retirement and price of leisure incentives. This could be due to the fact that in the 
gradual retirement regime, workers already pay a higher price (in terms of lower replacement 
rates) for more leisure time.  
 The results of our ranking analysis are thus not in line with our expectation that the 
introduction of gradual retirement opportunities would lead to substantially different 
retirement patterns (Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996; Reday-Mulvey 2000). However, our 
results are consistent with other studies which showed that many workers are more likely to 
choose full-retirement over partial retirement (Van Soest et al. 2006; and Kantarci and Van 
Soest 2013).  
 
Heterogeneity in preferences 
The above findings are likely to hide underlying heterogeneity in the way gradual retirement 
affects the retirement age and labour supply across groups of workers, as well as preferences 
for gradual retirement. Previous evidence by De Grip et al. (2013) showed that an announced 
                                                          
18
 Table A5 reports marginal effects of a multinomial logit model on the ranking of the six scenarios. The table 
shows that there are no strong non-linearities in the impact of gradual retirement on the ranking of the different 
scenarios.  
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increase in the eligibility age for the statutory old age pension in the Netherlands leads to 
substantially different treatment effects for different groups of workers. We here analyse the 
extent to which the introduction of gradual retirement opportunities affects differently the 
retirement age, the full-time equivalent retirement age, and the ranking of the scenarios of 
different groups of workers. We look at the following personal and job characteristics: 
gender, age, education level, wage, marital status, whether workers have a partner with own 
income, whether the partner works, the number of sick days in the past year, and self-
assessed life expectancy.
19
  
 Table 6 shows the OLS regressions of the heterogeneous treatment effects on 
workers’ retirement age (Column 1), the full-time-equivalent retirement age (Column 2), and 
the ranking of the scenarios (Column 3). The interaction term between each personal 
characteristic and the gradual retirement dummy indicates whether different types of workers 
react differently to the gradual retirement option. The table shows that highly-educated, 
married, workers who have partners with own income, and those who have many sick days or 
lower self-assessed life expectancy choose to retire earlier.
20
 There are, however, small 
heterogeneous effects in the interaction between personal and job characteristics and gradual 
retirement. We find that highly educated workers tend to retire earlier when they have the 
option to gradually retire, while workers who are married will retire somewhat later.
21
 Table 
6 further shows that workers with a high wage rank gradual retirement significantly higher, 
which is consistent with abundant evidence suggesting that the elasticity of weekly hours of 
work with respect to the wage rate is negative (Camerer 1997; Chou 2002; Fehr and Götte 
2007). Workers with a higher life expectancy, rank the gradual retirement option significantly 
                                                          
19
 Subjective survival probabilities are measured by the following survey question:  How large do you think is 
the chance that you will attain (at least) the age of 80, where 0 means 0% change and 100 means 100% 
change? 
20
 Highly educated workers may tend to retire early because they are more likely to have accumulated sufficient 
pension wealth. Our data, however, do not allow us to control for workers’ wealth. 
21
 As a robustness check, we also estimated a multinomial logit model to account for non-linearity and found 
similar results. 
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lower, most likely because their longer life expectancy prolongs the period in which they 
receive pension benefits.   
We also analyse in more detail how the content of a worker’s job in terms of routine 
and non-routine job tasks affects the impact of gradual retirement. The extent to which 
employees perform routine or non-routine tasks is measured by the following survey 
question:  
 
How often do you spend time on the following tasks in your job? You can give your answer 
on a scale from 0 until 10, where 0 means ‘never’ and 10 means ‘always’:  
1) Short repetitive tasks (fixed procedures etc.)    
2) Supervision of other employees 
3) Solving problems for which it takes at least 30 minutes to come to an adequate 
solution.               
We take item 1 as an indicator for routine tasks, while our indicator of the extent to which 
employees perform non-routine tasks is based on the arithmetic average of items 2 and 3.  
 Table 7 shows the heterogeneity analyses by job tasks. The table shows that workers 
who perform more non-routine tasks in their job are more likely to retire earlier, but that the 
opportunity to retire more gradually induces them to stay longer in the labour market which 
increases their net labour supply.
22
 This is consistent with the evidence by De Grip et al. 
(2013) that employees who have psychologically demanding tasks will retire early in a full-
time retirement system. Gradual retirement may subsequently help them to better cope with 
the heavy mental work demands in their job, allowing them to maintain their job to a later 
age. We do also observe, however, that these workers do not rank the gradual retirement 
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 These results are robust to the inclusion of the education dummies and their interactions with the gradual 
retirement option as reported in Table 6. 
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option higher, which might be because workers with cognitive demanding tasks are also often 
more constrained to work part-time.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we use data from a stated preferences experiment to study the extent to which 
gradual retirement affects workers’ retirement age and labour supply. Existing exploratory 
evidence in the literature suggests that gradual retirement may not lead to a net increase in 
total labour supply of older workers (e.g., Gielen 2009; Machado and Portela 2012). 
However, these studies focused on actual retirement decisions and therefore do not identify 
all retirement options which were available to older workers, because the options that are not 
chosen cannot be observed, or because it is not even clear which options could have been 
chosen by workers (Kantarci and Van Soest 2008, 2013). Stated preferences solve this 
problem by capturing a broader array of preference-driven behaviours, and can therefore be 
used to estimate the causal relation between gradual retirement and a worker’s age of 
retirement and labour supply. Concerns may arise about the external validity of retirement 
options in stated preference studies, especially if these retirement options are not yet existent 
in reality (Kantarci and Van Soest 2013).
23
 However, the literature shows that stated 
preference estimates and the estimates based on actual behaviour data are usually quite close 
(Louviere et al. 2000). 
We find that gradual retirement schemes, compared to full retirement schemes, 
stimulates worker to retire approximately one year later. Total labour supply, however, 
significantly decreases in gradual retirement systems, as the positive effect of postponing 
retirement on labour supply is cancelled out by the reduction of working hours before full 
retirement. We furthermore show that financial incentives to postpone retirement (changes in 
                                                          
23
 Another limitation of our study is that we focus on public sector employees. The sectors covered are, 
however, large and include 13% of the total Dutch labour force. 
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the accrual rate in the pension scheme and reductions in pension income) significantly 
increase the expected retirement age. However, the impact of financial incentives on workers’ 
retirement expectations is similar across gradual and full retirement options.  
From a policy perspective, the introduction of gradual retirement options could be 
welfare enhancing, as those who do prefer such option would choose it, and those who don’t 
would not choose to retire gradually. However, our ranking analysis of the different pension 
scheme scenarios shows that gradual retirement is not a preferred option among workers as 
the large majority still prefers full retirement. This holds particularly for workers with lower 
wages or high life expectancy. Our results also suggest that changing current retirement 
schemes into gradual retirement schemes would not contribute to a further increase in the 
labour supply of older generations. There is, however, some heterogeneity across workers as 
those with non-routine job tasks may be inclined to postpone their retirement when they have 
the possibility to gradually retire. It is therefore possible that sectors that employ a large share 
of workers with non-routine job tasks can increase their labour supply if they shift from a 
full-time retirement scheme to a gradual retirement scheme. 
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Figure 1: The distribution of retirement age choices 
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Figure 2a: Differences in marginal effects of a multinomial logit on early, middle and late retirement: 
shocks in accrual rates and gradual retirement (marginal effects relative to the full-time base scenario) 
 
 
Figure 2b: Differences in marginal effects of a multinomial logit on early, middle and late retirement: 
income shocks and gradual retirement (marginal effects relative to the full-time base scenario) 
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Table 1: Retirement scenarios 
 Retirement age
*
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Regular 
retirement 
 accruals: 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 7.5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
 accruals 
10%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 85% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 80% at 
68 
 62 60 45 30 55 50 
 63 65 52.5 40 60 55 
 64 70 60 50 65 60 
 65 75 67.5 60 70 65 
 66 80 75 70 75 70 
 67 85 82.5 80 80 75 
 68 90 90 90 85 80 
 69 95 97.5 100 90 85 
 70 100 105 110 95 90 
  6 7 8 9 10 
  Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Gradual  
retirement  
 accruals: 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 7.5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
 accruals 
10%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 85% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 80% at 
68 
 62-63 62.5 48.75 35 57.2 52.5 
 62-64 65 52.5 40 60 55 
 63-64 67.5 56.25 45 62.5 57.5 
 63-65 70 60 50 65 60 
 62-67 72.5 63.75 55 67.5 62.5 
 64-65 72.5 63.75 55 67.5 62.5 
 63-67 75 67.5 60 70 65 
 64-66 75 67.5 60 70 65 
 66-67 77.5 71.25 65 72.5 67.5 
 65-66 77.5 71.25 65 72.5 67.5 
 62-70 80 75 70 75 70 
 65-67 80 75 70 75 70 
 63-70 82.5 78.75 75 77.5 72.5 
 66-67 82.5 78.75 75 77.5 72.5 
 65-69 85 82.5 80 80 75 
 66-68 85 82.5 80 80 75 
 66-69 87.5 86.25 85 82.5 77.5 
 67-68 87.5 86.25 85 82.5 77.5 
 66-70 90 90 90 85 80 
 67-70 92.5 93.75 95 87.5 82.5 
 68-70 95 97.5 100 90 85 
 69-70 97.5 101.25 105 92.5 87.5 
* Under gradual retirement scenarios, the first age is the age of starting work on part-time (gradual) basis, and the second age 
is the age of full retirement. 
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Table 2: Retirement scenarios, retirement age, and full-time-equivalent age of retirement 
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 
 Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Regular retirement accruals: 
5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 7.5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
 accruals 
10%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 85% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 80% at 
68 
      
Retirement age 
 
64.97 65.84 66.05 65.40 65.99 
 (1.80) (1.56) (1.36) (1.72) (1.77) 
Full-time-
equivalent age of 
retirement 
64.97 65.84 66.05 65.40 65.99 
 (1.80) (1.56) (1.36) (1.72) (1.77) 
Scenario 6 7 8 9 10 
 Baseline Price of leisure incentive Pension wealth incentive 
Gradual  retirement  accruals: 
5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 7.5%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
 accruals 
10%; 
replacement 
rate: 90% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 85% at 
68 
accruals 5%; 
replacement 
rate: 80% at 
68 
      
Retirement age 
 
65.95 66.65 67.18 66.34 66.88 
 (1.83) (1.76) (1.73) (1.75) (1.92) 
Full-time-
equivalent age of 
retirement 
64.77 65.36 65.79 65.10 65.59 
 (1.47) (1.38) (1.27) (1.44) (1.56) 
In case of a full-time pension scheme, the increase in the preferred age of retirement is equal to the increase in the full-time-
equivalent retirement age. Because employees who gradually retire are defined to only work 50% of a full-time job in the 
vignettes, an increase in the preferred part-time retirement age with one year increases the full-time equivalent retirement age 
with only 6 months.  
 
 
27 
 
Table 3: The relationship between gradual retirement and retirement age and full-time-equivalent age of retirement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Retirement Age Full-time-equivalent age of retirement 
       
Gradual retirement 0.977*** 0.976*** 0.964*** -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.224*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) 
Price of leisure incentive  0.601*** 0.591***  0.545*** 0.585*** 
  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.013) (0.016) 
Gradual retirement* Price of leisure 
incentive 
  0.021   -0.079*** 
   (0.026)   (0.017) 
Pension income incentive  0.464*** 0.462***  0.444*** 0.467*** 
  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.015) 
Gradual retirement*Pension income 
incentive 
  0.004   -0.047*** 
   (0.024)   (0.017) 
       
Constant 65.695*** 65.094*** 65.101*** 65.692*** 65.147*** 65.115*** 
 (0.097) (0.101) (0.101) (0.092) (0.095) (0.096) 
Observations 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 
R-squared 0.072 0.128 0.128 0.016 0.079 0.080 
Full-time-equivalent age of retirement estimated to be six months for each additional year of (part-time) employment / retirement. Dummies for randomization of scenarios 
included as controls. OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Ranking of preferences for different retirement scenarios  
Retirement Scenario 
Average 
ranking 
Percentage most 
preferred scenario 
Scenario 1 5.13 57.4 
Scenario 2 3.83 5.0 
Scenario 3 2.85 2.2 
Scenario 4 3.80 2.4 
Scenario 5 2.54 0.9 
Scenario 6 4.39 26.2 
Scenario 7 3.06 2.6 
Scenario 8 1.95 1.0 
Scenario 9 3.06 1.3 
Scenario 10 1.85 1.1 
In total, 6 scenarios were ranked by the respondents. The most 
preferred scenario is attributed value 6, while the least preferred 
scenario was attributed value 1. Column 1 shows the average ranking 
of the scenarios. Column 2 shows how many workers chose the 
different scenarios as their most preferred scenario.  
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Table 5: Ranking the scenarios 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
    
Gradual retirement -0.764*** -0.764*** -0.732*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.054) 
Price of leisure incentive  -1.189*** -1.150*** 
  (0.024) (0.031) 
Gradual retirement* Price of leisure incentive   -0.077** 
   (0.037) 
Pension income incentive  -1.273*** -1.280*** 
  (0.021) (0.028) 
Gradual retirement*Pension income incentive   0.015 
   (0.038) 
Constant 3.881*** 5.112*** 5.096*** 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.033) 
Observations 8,897 8,897 8,897 
R-squared 0.050 0.397 0.397 
OLS-estimated including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Gradual retirement and full-time-equivalent age of retirement, heterogeneity analysis on 
personal characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement age Fulltime 
equivalent of 
retirement age 
Ranking of 
scenarios 
    
Gradual retirement 1.005** -0.233 -1.852** 
 (0.480) (0.361) (0.727) 
Male 0.099 0.098 0.057 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.050) 
Male * gradual retirement 0.049 0.084* -0.113 
 (0.061) (0.047) (0.099) 
Age -0.010 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Age * gradual retirement -0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
High education level (intermediate level = ref) -0.299*** -0.298*** -0.004 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.054) 
High education level * gradual retirement -0.149** -0.028 0.005 
 (0.069) (0.050) (0.109) 
Low education level 0.107 0.106 0.164 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.126) 
Low education level * gradual retirement -0.054 0.011 -0.329 
 (0.151) (0.115) (0.247) 
Wage -0.014 -0.014 -0.121*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.039) 
Wage * gradual retirement 0.035 -0.023 0.244*** 
 (0.051) (0.038) (0.077) 
Married -0.310** -0.308** -0.061 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.091) 
Married * gradual retirement 0.178* 0.091 0.116 
 (0.106) (0.079) (0.183) 
Partner with own income -0.307* -0.308* 0.042 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.091) 
Partner with own income * gradual retirement -0.015 0.080 -0.077 
 (0.114) (0.086) (0.183) 
Partner works 0.073 0.071 -0.060 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.065) 
Partner works * gradual retirement -0.027 -0.044 0.119 
 (0.086) (0.065) (0.130) 
Number of Sick days -0.003** -0.003** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Sick days * gradual retirement 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life expectancy 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Life expectancy * gradual retirement -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 66.413*** 66.406*** 4.427*** 
 (0.859) (0.859) (0.364) 
Observations 10,008 10,008 8,477 
R-squared 0.100 0.050 0.055 
OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 7: Gradual retirement and full-time-equivalent age of retirement, heterogeneity analysis on job 
characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Retirement age Fulltime 
equivalent of 
retirement age 
Ranking of 
scenarios 
    
Gradual retirement 0.774*** -0.440*** -0.657*** 
 (0.081) (0.063) (0.147) 
Routine tasks 0.006 0.006 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) 
Routine tasks * gradual retirement 0.011 0.008 -0.025 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.018) 
Non-Routine tasks -0.030* -0.030* -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) 
Non-Routine tasks * gradual retirement 0.026** 0.018** 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) 
Constant 65.637*** 65.637*** 3.829*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.074) 
Observations 10,476 10,476 8,849 
R-squared 0.068 0.010 0.051 
OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix: 
Table A1: Background characteristics. 
Characteristic Average Standard 
deviation 
Age 56.12 5.70 
Gender (1 if male) 0.62 0.48 
Married 0.82 0.39 
High-educated 0.72 0.44 
Low-educated 0.04 0.20 
Log monthly wage 7.73 0.54 
Partner with income 0.71 0.45 
Partner with work .57 0.50 
Number of sick days 1.11 1.27 
Life expectancy (probability to reach 
age 80) 
0.83 0.18 
Cognitive tasks (on a scale from 0-10) 4.62 2.49 
Repetitive tasks (on a scale from 0-10) 6.16 2.52 
Subjective life expectancy probabilities are measured by the following survey question:  How large do you think is the 
chance that you will attain (at least) the age of 80, where 0 means 0% change and 100 means 100% change? The extent 
to which employees perform routine or non-routine tasks is measured by the following survey questions:  How often do 
you spend time on the following tasks in your job? You can give your answer on a scale from 0 until 10, where 0 means 
‘never’ and 10 means ‘always’: Short repetitive tasks (fixed procedures etc.); Supervision of other employees; Solving 
problems for which it takes at least 30 minutes to come to an adequate solution. We take item 1 as an indicator for 
routine tasks, while our indicator of the extent to which employees perform non-routine tasks is based on the arithmetic 
average of items 2 and 3. 
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Table A2: Background characteristics by retirement scenario  
Characteristic Percentage 
 
F-value 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9 Scenario 10 
 Age 56.1 56.3 56.0 56.2 56.2 56.1 56.0 56.3 56.0 55.9 0.34 
Gender (1 if male) 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.47 
Married 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.37 
Highly educated 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.0.4 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.68 
Low-educated 7.74 7.74 7.73 7.74 7.75 7.74 7.73 7.73 7.74 7.74 0.37 
Log monthly wage 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.09 
Partner with income 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.70 
Partner with work 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.48 
Sick days 1.11 1.13 1.110 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.08 1.15 1.08 1.07 0.18 
Life expectancy 
(probability to reach 
age 80) 
83.3 83.1 83.3 83.3 83.2 83.3 83.3 83.2 83.4 83.4 0.36 
Cognitive tasks 4.61 4.59 4.61 4.61 4.62 4.62 4.62 4.58 4.65 4.66 0.03 
Repetitive tasks 6.17 6.20 6.13 6.21 6.21 6.17 6.12 6.20 6.14 6.13 0.08 
Subjective life expectancy probabilities are measured by the following survey question:  How large do you think is the chance that you will attain (at least) the age of 80, where 0 means 0% 
change and 100 means 100% change? The extent to which employees perform routine or non-routine tasks is measured by the following survey questions:  How often do you spend time on the 
following tasks in your job? You can give your answer on a scale from 0 until 10, where 0 means ‘never’ and 10 means ‘always’: Short repetitive tasks (fixed procedures etc.); Supervision of 
other employees; Solving problems for which it takes at least 30 minutes to come to an adequate solution. We take item 1 as an indicator for routine tasks, while our indicator of the extent to 
which employees perform non-routine tasks is based on the arithmetic average of items 2 and 3.  
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Table A3: Basic model including individual fixed effects  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Retirement age Fulltime 
equivalent of 
retirement age 
   
Gradual retirement 0.964*** -0.224*** 
 (0.029) (0.023) 
Price of leisure incentive 0.591*** 0.585*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Gradual retirement* Price of leisure incentive 0.021 -0.079*** 
 (0.026) (0.017) 
Pension income incentive 0.462*** 0.467*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Gradual retirement*Pension income incentive 0.004 -0.047*** 
 (0.024) (0.017) 
Constant 65.001*** 65.000*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,560 10,560 
R-squared 0.375 0.330 
Number of individuals 1,760 1,760 
OLS estimates including robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
35 
 
Table A4: The relationship between gradual retirement and retirement age: nonlinear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Multinomial logit estimates: Retirement ages 65 
and 66 are ref. 
Early 
retirement 
(64 years or 
younger) 
Late retirement 
(67) years or 
older 
Early 
retirement 
(64 years or 
younger) 
Late retirement 
67) years or 
older 
Early 
retirement 
(64 years or 
younger) 
Late retirement 
67) years or 
older 
       
Gradual retirement -0.236*** 1.090*** -0.299*** 1.123*** -0.593*** 0.917*** 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.050) (0.045) (0.065) (0.066) 
Price of leisure incentive   -0.761*** 0.337*** -0.930*** 0.181*** 
   (0.050) (0.029) (0.054) (0.037) 
Gradual retirement* Price of leisure incentive     0.480*** 0.333*** 
     (0.079) (0.054) 
Pension income incentive   -0.392*** 0.301*** -0.500*** 0.280*** 
   (0.035) (0.028) (0.043) (0.038) 
Gradual retirement*Pension income incentive     0.288*** 0.046 
     (0.065) (0.054) 
Constant -1.116*** -0.575*** -0.528*** -0.954*** -0.418** -0.851*** 
 (0.153) (0.118) (0.162) (0.128) (0.162) (0.132) 
Observations 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 10,560 
Coefficient estimates on which the marginal effects presented in Figure 2 are based. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5: Ranking the scenarios: multinomial logit results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Least 
preferred 
scenario 
    Most 
preferred 
scenario 
Model 1       
Gradual retirement 0.125*** 0.038*** 0.040*** -0.062*** -0.024*** -0.116*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Model 2       
Gradual retirement 0.125*** 0.039*** 0.041*** -0.062*** -0.025*** -0.116*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Price of leisure incentive 0.171*** 0.065*** 0.015*** -0.007 -0.061*** -0.184*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Pension income incentive 0.179*** 0.080*** 0.026*** 0.012*** -0.064*** -0.234*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
Marginal effects. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Column 1 shows the marginal effects for the least preferred scenario, while Column 6 shows the estimates for the most preferred 
scenario. Model 1 reports the estimates for gradual retirement only. Model 2 reports the estimates for gradual retirement controlled for 
financial incentives (i.e., price of leisure and pension income).  
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Figure A1: Examples of the retirement vignettes 
We would like to know more about your retirement preferences. In the following six 
questions, we therefore confront you with different retirement schemes. Thereby, you always 
have to assume that you presently work full-time.  
 
Some of these schemes only enable you to retire full-time, while other schemes enable you to 
first retire part-time for several years before you retire full-time (you always retire for half 
and have to continue work for half in these schemes until you fully stop working). It always 
holds that the earlier you retire, the lower your pension will be.  
 
In each question, we present a table in which for each possible retirement age is shown how 
much pension you will receive from that age. The income is net (free disposable after taxes 
and benefits) and is expressed as a percentage of your current net wage. Your state old age 
pension (AOW) and the income from part-time work (in case of part-time retirement) are 
already included in the calculation. In the schemes in which you first retire part-time, you 
would receive this income during the period in which you are part-time retired and during 
the period thereafter.  
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Scenario 1 
If you could choose among these possibilities, at what age you prefer to stop working?  
Age of retirement Replacement rate (as % of net income) 
  
62 60 
63 65 
64 70 
65 75 
66 80 
67 85 
68 90 
69 95 
70 100 
 
o Completely stop working at the age of 62 years at an income of 60%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 63 years at an income of 65%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 64 years at an income of 70%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 65 years at an income of 75%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 66 years at an income of 80%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 67 years at an income of 85%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 68 years at an income of 90%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 69 years at an income of 95%  
o Completely stop working at the age of 70 years at an income of 100% 
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Scenario 6 
If you could choose among these possibilities, at what age you prefer to stop working?  
Age of gradual retirement to full retirement Replacement rate (as % of net income) 
  62-63 62.5 
62-64 65 
63-64 67.5 
63-65 70 
62-67 72.5 
64-65 72.5 
63-67 75 
64-66 75 
66-67 77.5 
65-66 77.5 
62-70 80 
65-67 80 
63-70 82.5 
66-67 82.5 
65-69 85 
66-68 85 
66-69 87.5 
67-68 87.5 
66-70 90 
67-70 92.5 
68-70 95 
69-70 97.5 
 
o Gradual retirement from  62 until 63, from 63years fully retired at a retirement income of 62.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  62 until 64, from 64years fully retired at a retirement income of 65%  
o Gradual retirement from  63 until 64, from 64years fully retired at a retirement income of 67.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  63 until 65, from 65years fully retired at a retirement income of 70%  
o Gradual retirement from  62 until 67, from 67years fully retired at a retirement income of 72.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  64 until 65, from 65years fully retired at a retirement income of 72.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  63 until 67, from 67years fully retired at a retirement income of 75%  
o Gradual retirement from  64 until 66, from 66years fully retired at a retirement income of 75%  
o Gradual retirement from  64 until 67, from 67years fully retired at a retirement income of 77.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  65 until 66, from 66years fully retired at a retirement income of 77.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  62 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 80%  
o Gradual retirement from  65 until 67, from 67years fully retired at a retirement income of 80%  
o Gradual retirement from  63 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 82.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  66 until 67, from 67years fully retired at a retirement income of 82.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  65 until 69, from 69years fully retired at a retirement income of 85%  
o Gradual retirement from  66 until 68, from 68years fully retired at a retirement income of 85%  
o Gradual retirement from  66 until 69, from 69years fully retired at a retirement income of 87.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  67 until 68, from 68years fully retired at a retirement income of 87.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  66 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 90%  
o Gradual retirement from  67 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 92.5%  
o Gradual retirement from  68 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 95%  
o Gradual retirement from  69 until 70, from 70years fully retired at a retirement income of 97.5%  
